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Abstract
This paper examines church sanctuary incidents in Canada 
involving unsuccessful refugee claimants seeking to avoid 
deportation . The author contends that when faith-based 
communities develop formal screening mechanisms to 
determine who among the many that request it is accorded 
sanctuary, they apply similar norms and procedures as 
those found in Canada’s official refugee determination 
process . The author argues that although sanctuary practi-
ces are often criticized as a form of civil disobedience that 
poses a threat to the rule of law, it is also possible to under-
stand sanctuary practices as a means through which faith-
based communities prevent the state from violating both 
Canadian and international refugee law, thereby uphold-
ing rule-of-law norms .
Résumé
Cet article examine les cas de sanctuaire survenus au 
Canada dans une église impliquant des demandeurs d’asile 
déboutés visant à éviter la déportation . Lorsque les commu-
nautés confessionnelles, soutient l’auteur, mettent au point 
des mécanismes de contrôle formels pour déterminer à qui, 
parmi les nombreux demandeurs, accorder le sanctuaire, 
elles appliquent des normes et des procédures similaires à 
celles qu’on trouve dans le processus officiel canadien de 
détermination de réfugiés . Bien que ces pratiques de sanc-
tuaire soient souvent critiquées comme une forme de déso-
béissance civile qui constitue une menace pour la primauté 
du droit, l’auteur soutient qu’il est également possible de 
les comprendre comme moyen par lequel les communau-
tés confessionnelles empêchent l’État de porter atteinte au 
droit tant canadien qu’international des réfugiés, confir-
mant ainsi les normes de la règle de droit .
Introduction
Sanctuary is an institution which, in the Christian trad-
ition,1 traces its roots to religious norms, ancient Greek and 
Roman law, medieval European law, and Catholic canon 
law.2 In many Western states this institution was explicitly 
abolished as a matter of state law3 by the early seventeenth 
century.4 However, sanctuary appears to be undergoing 
something of a revival in recent years.5
In Canada, most contemporary sanctuary incidents 
involve unsuccessful refugee claimants who allege that their 
claims were wrongly denied. With the permission of faith-
based communities, these unsuccessful refugee claimants 
take up residence in sacred buildings, usually Christian 
churches.6 Canadian immigration officials are reluctant 
to enter churches for the purposes of enforcing immigra-
tion law. As a result, those taking sanctuary benefit from 
a de facto suspension of deportation while they remain 
within churches. In many cases, this suspension of depor-
tation ultimately ends with migrants securing Canadian 
permanent residence through discretionary immigration 
procedures.7
In media accounts and popular discourse about Canadian 
sanctuary incidents, arguments about the legality of these 
practices play a central role. To date, however, few legal 
scholars have critically assessed the competing legal claims 
at stake. This article seeks to offer such an assessment, focus-
ing on evaluating rule-of-law arguments deployed by the 
proponents and critics of sanctuary.
The article begins by outlining Canadian sanctuary 
practices. Next it examines the screening mechanisms 
that Canadian churches deploy to decide who, among the 
many that request it, is accorded sanctuary. Interestingly, 
these screening mechanisms mimic the official refugee 
determination system: lawyers get involved, alleged fears of 
persecution are scrutinized, supporting country condition 
documentation is considered, and various interpretations of 
43
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
Refuge26-1.indd   43 8/13/10   9:10:09 PM
refugee law are propounded. The paper explores this curi-
ous phenomenon whereby sanctuary providers replicate 
the refugee determination process whose outcomes they 
reject. Then, through a close analysis of the relevant provi-
sions of Canadian state law, the paper argues that, although 
sanctuary practices are frequently criticized on rule-of-law 
grounds as involving illegal acts of civil disobedience, it is 
not at all obvious that they should be considered as such. To 
the contrary, while there may be some rule-of law- arguments 
against Canadian sanctuary practices, it is also plausible to 
understand these practices as a means through which faith-
based communities prevent the state from violating both 
Canadian and international refugee law.
Canadian Church Sanctuary Practices
The Lippert Study: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents
In Sanctuary, Sovereignty, and Sacrifice, Randy Lippert 
offers a comprehensive study of Canadian sanctuary prac-
tices.8 Drawing on the work of Paul Weller, who stud-
ied sanctuary incidents in Britain,9 Lippert suggests that 
sanctuary can involve either exposure or concealment 
strategies. When sanctuary providers employ exposure 
 strategies they make sustained efforts to publicize the stor-
ies of those accorded sanctuary in the hopes that such pub-
licity will make it politically difficult for state officials to 
undertake deportation activities. In contrast, when sanctu-
ary providers resort to concealment strategies they  actively 
hide those taking sanctuary so as to avoid their detection 
by state officials and the deportation that might follow 
from that detection.10 In his study of Canadian sanctuary 
incidents, due in part to methodological considerations, 
Lippert concentrates on the former. For the purposes of 
his study, he defines sanctuary as “those incidents in which 
migrants actually entered and remained in … [a church] 
to avoid deportation and that entailed strategic efforts to 
expose this fact to mass media, communities, and political 
authorities.”11
Based on this definition, Lippert identifies thirty-six 
sanctuary incidents in Canada during a twenty-year per-
iod beginning in 1983, when the first known instance of 
Canadian church sanctuary occurred.12 These thirty-six 
incidents concerned 261 migrants of twenty-eight different 
nationalities.13 All but two incidents involved non-citizens 
subject to deportation who had previously made unsuccess-
ful refugee claims in Canada and who continued to allege 
that they faced serious risks of persecution abroad.14
Perhaps the most striking of Lippert’s findings relates to 
the outcomes of sanctuary incidents. In all thirty-six cases, 
sanctuary successfully delayed deportation.15 Moreover, 
during the twenty-year period of the study, the police and 
immigration officials refrained from entering churches 
to arrest migrants in sanctuary.16 Similarly, no sanctu-
ary providers were charged with violating Canadian law.17 
More surprisingly, in 58 per cent of the sanctuary incidents 
Lippert identifies, migrants in sanctuary ultimately secured 
the legal right to remain in Canada indefinitely, usually as 
Permanent Residents.18 In the remaining cases, migrants 
either voluntarily left the church to go underground or to 
co-operate with their deportation (25 per cent), or the out-
come was unclear or pending at the time of the study (14 per 
cent).19
Without wishing to downplay the hardship associated 
with spending several months physically confined to a 
church building that is not designed for human habitation,20 
it must be said that the success rate that Lippert identifies 
in sanctuary incidents is truly remarkable. To put this rate 
in context, consider that the success rate in judicial reviews 
of negative refugee determinations is less than 2 per cent.21 
Other means of delaying deportation are similarly ineffec-
tual.22 In other words, sanctuary is one of the most effective 
avenues currently available to unsuccessful refugee claim-
ants seeking the right to remain in Canada.
Screening Procedures: Mimicking the Official Refugee 
Determination System
One of the likely reasons sanctuary is so successful in 
Canada is that churches carefully screen applicants to 
ensure that only those who have strong cases for refugee 
protection are accorded sanctuary.23 As a result, far more 
migrants request sanctuary than are accorded it. Indeed, 
United Church pastor Darryl Gray, whose congregation 
offered sanctuary on two occasions, notes that he turns 
away requests for sanctuary on a weekly basis, “because 
they are often economic refugees who can’t prove they face 
physical danger.”24
To help congregations screen applicants for sanctuary, the 
United Church has prepared a detailed pamphlet entitled 
Sanctuary for Refugees?: A Guide for Congregations .25 This 
30-page pamphlet, in addition to reproducing the text of the 
refugee definition as established by the 1951 UN Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees,26 recommends steps that 
can be taken to determine whether those requesting sanctu-
ary meet the refugee definition. Included among those rec-
ommendations is the following:
A congregation … considering a request for sanctuary … must 
learn as much as possible about that person to determine whether 
or not this is a bona fide claim. Over two to three interviews … it 
is essential to learn as much as possible about the person’s story. In 
the interest of clarity, no reasonable question should be ignored or 
considered impolite or irrelevant.
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Check the merits of the case with representatives of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty 
International … Find out whether the country has a history of 
gross and systemic human rights violations and tolerates the per-
secution of minority groups … Country Reports are also available 
through regional Documentation Centres of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board.27
What is interesting about these and other passages in the 
guide is that they tell United Church congregations to care-
fully screen applicants for sanctuary using essentially the 
same legal tests, the same means of evaluating testimony, 
and even the same documentary evidence regarding coun-
try conditions that are employed in the official Canadian 
refugee determination process. Moreover, the United 
Church is not the only denomination to develop formal 
screening practices that mimic the official refugee deter-
mination system in this manner. The Presbyterian Church, 
for example, has issued guidelines that offer essentially the 
same advice.28
Given the existence of such guidelines, it is likely that the 
small number of migrants who successfully pass through 
sanctuary screening procedures have highly persuasive 
cases. It is therefore understandable that, in combination 
with pressure brought to bear on political actors, sanctu-
ary providers are frequently able to persuade immigration 
officials to exercise their discretion to grant exceptions on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds to the regu-
lar rules regarding qualification for Canadian Permanent 
Residence.29
Policy Change and Sanctuary Incidents
In addition to the success of Canadian sanctuary incidents 
at the level of individual cases, there is also some indica-
tion that sanctuary practices in Canada may be effective 
at the level of policy change. According to Lippert’s study, 
the frequency of Canadian sanctuary incidents is increas-
ing. Indeed, 19 per cent of the sanctuary incidents Lippert 
identified from 1983 through 2003 occurred in 2003.30 One 
of the reasons for this increase is a frustration that sanc-
tuary  providers display towards a feature of Canada’s refu-
gee determination system.31 Canada’s current immigration 
legislation, passed in 2001, sets out a procedure through 
which unsuccessful refugee claimants may have their 
initial refugee determinations reviewed on their merits by 
the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board.32 The Canadian government, however, 
selectively implemented the provisions of the legislation, 
bringing the provisions of the legislation into force33 except 
those pertaining to the RAD.34 According to the United 
Church’s pamphlet on sanctuary,
until the appeal comes into force ‘refugee determinations’ will 
continue to be made without the benefit of a sober second opinion 
or an effective way to correct factual errors. This … has increased 
the chances of bona fide refugees being deported.35
Similarly, according to a declaration by the Interfaith 
Sanctuary Coalition:
Any system of adjudication is open to error. That is why virtu-
ally every decision-making process involving rights of any signifi-
cance gives rise to a right of appeal. Since the abolition of capital 
punishment in Canada, the decision to grant or refuse refugee 
determination status is the only judicial decision in Canada which 
can result in someone’s death.
Despite the extreme gravity of the refugee determination deci-
sion, there is no appeal on the merits available to refused refugee 
claimants … The lack of appeal [is] … the most important flaw 
in Canada’s refugee determination system, since its inception in 
1989.36
In 2006, in response to these and similar critiques,37 
Bloc Québécois MP Nicole Demers introduced a Private 
Member’s Bill requiring the government to immediately 
proclaim the coming into force of the legislative provisions 
establishing the RAD.38 At the time of writing, the Bill had 
passed the third reading in the House of Commons, and 
appeared likely to be passed in the Senate. However, the Bill 
was placed on hold by the decision of the Harper govern-
ment to call an election in the fall of 2008. Nonetheless, it 
is worth noting that in Parliamentary debates regarding the 
RAD—including debates surrounding this Bill—the failure 
to implement the RAD is frequently and explicitly linked 
to the fact that unsuccessful refugee claimants who say that 
mistakes were made in their initial refugee determination 
resort to church sanctuary to avoid deportation.39 It thus 
seems that sanctuary practices have been influential not just 
in assisting individual migrants, but also in contributing to 
the larger debates about Canadian refugee policy.
Recent Trends: Violations of Sanctuary
It must be acknowledged that two recent cases, at first glance, 
appear to suggest that sanctuary may be less  successful 
today than it was during the period of Lippert’s study (i .e . 
1983–2003).
The first incident occurred on March 5, 2004, when police 
officers stormed the Saint-Pierre United Church in Quebec 
City. The police officers were searching for Mohamed Cherfi, 
an Algerian political activist who had made an unsuccessful 
refugee claim and who was subject to a deportation order.40 
To avoid his imminent deportation, Cherfi had publicly taken 
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sanctuary in the church after convincing the church com-
munity that he faced a serious risk of persecution should he 
be removed to Algeria. In the first known violation of sanc-
tuary in Canada, Cherfi was arrested inside the church and 
taken to a police station, where he was immediately trans-
ferred to the custody of Canadian Border Service Agency 
(CBSA) officials. Several years prior, Cherfi had transited to 
Canada via the United States. Thus, to effect his deportation, 
CBSA officials drove him directly to the border, where he 
was turned over to US immigration authorities.41
The second incident occurred on February 17, 2007, when 
a police officer arrested Amir Kazemian inside an Anglican 
church in Vancouver. Kazemian, also an unsuccessful refu-
gee claimant subject to a deportation order, had been in 
sanctuary in the church for almost three years. He alleged 
that his refugee claim had been wrongly denied, noting that 
his mother obtained refugee status in Canada (in a decision 
made by a different refugee adjudicator) on the basis of iden-
tical factual allegations. Curiously, there is no indication that 
the police set out to breach sanctuary in this case. In fact, it 
was Kazemian who called the police to the church to inves-
tigate a complaint about a client of an online business he 
ran from inside the church because the client had allegedly 
engaged in threatening behaviour. When the police officer 
arrived at the church and discovered the outstanding depor-
tation order, however, she promptly arrested Kazemian. This 
move surprised Kazemian’s supporters because other police 
officers had interacted with him at the church on prior occa-
sions without incident.42
While the Cherfi and Kazemian cases might appear to 
suggest that sanctuary in Canada has become less successful 
than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, on closer inspection such 
a conclusion does not seem warranted. To appreciate why 
this is the case, it is important to understand that neither 
Cherfi nor Kazemian was ultimately returned to his country 
of origin.
In Kazemian’s case, within two days of his arrest, which 
garnered national media attention, the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration exercised its discretion to 
grant his prior request for Canadian Permanent Residence 
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Immigration 
officials, somewhat implausibly, claimed that the timing of 
the decision was not related to his arrest.43
In Cherfi’s case, resolution was much longer in coming. 
When Cherfi was forcibly removed from sanctuary and 
deported to the United States he applied for US asylum 
based on risks of persecution he claimed to face in Algeria. 
US immigration officials initially denied his application.44 
He then appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA). Fifteen months after he was first deported 
from Canada to the United States, the BIA announced its 
decision: the initial decision was overturned and Cherfi was 
granted refugee status in the United States.45 In other words, 
the BIA confirmed the legal argument made by the church 
that offered Cherfi sanctuary. That is to say, notwithstand-
ing negative determinations within first instance refugee 
adjudication forums in both Canada and the United States, 
when given a meaningful opportunity to appeal these nega-
tive decisions, Cherfi was able to demonstrate that he did, in 
fact, meet the refugee definition.
Legality and Canadian Sanctuary Incidents
Though the Cherfi and Kazemian cases—the only two known 
instances where Canadian police have arrested migrants in 
sanctuary—do not necessarily indicate that sanctuary has 
become less successful in recent years, they do lead to the 
main issue that I would like to address regarding Canadian 
sanctuary practices, namely, that law plays a complex and 
contested role in these practices.
Cherfi’s arrest and deportation generated significant 
public debate about sanctuary.46 Judy Sgro, then Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration, further fanned the flames 
of this controversy when, some months later, she called on 
churches to cease providing sanctuary to unsuccessful refu-
gee claimants.47 Sgro contended that sanctuary practices 
should be stopped because they violate Canadian law. As 
Sgro provocatively put it in the media, “Nobody is exempt 
from the law, no matter where you are.”48 Many Canadians, 
as shown by letters to the editor,49 editorials,50 and calls to 
national radio call-in shows,51 concurred with Sgro’s views.
Church groups, however, immediately responded to 
Sgro’s comments by insisting that they would continue to 
offer sanctuary.52 Moreover, many sanctuary supporters 
contested Sgro’s simple characterization of sanctuary as 
unlawful, suggesting that the matter was more complicated. 
In particular, many noted that churches intervene only in 
cases where the Canadian government is itself in danger of 
breaching international law as a result of its failure to design 
a refugee determination system with adequate procedural 
safeguards to prevent refugees from being deported to face 
persecution.53 As a spokesperson for the United Church of 
Canada noted in the national media: “The only time a church 
will ever put itself in the awkward place of offering sanctu-
ary to someone who requests it is because we understand 
that Canada … is not living up to its international obliga-
tions.”54 Similarly, a press release prepared by an association 
of congregations providing sanctuary notes:
“The real problem we want to address today is not sanctuary, but 
the flawed refugee determination system that fails to protect some 
refugees,” said Archbishop Andrew Hutchison … [c]iting the lack 
of a merit-based appeal process in refugee determinations.55
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Other supporters of sanctuary, however, suggested that 
it is precisely because of their distance from Canadian state 
law that sanctuary practices are valuable and should be 
maintained. For example, in an op-ed piece in the National 
Post, Father Raymond de Souza wrote:
The custom of sanctuary is a vestige of an era when the abso-
lute power of the state needed trimming. Our legal system today 
offers many protections and safeguards, but it is always good to be 
reminded there are places where the state does not go and where it 
does not assert its sovereignty.56
Or, as a caller to a national call-in radio show put it:
[Sanctuary] is the earliest form … [of] civil disobedience … of 
communities, small groups religiously affiliated or otherwise … 
resist[ing] top-down applications of power … When peaceful 
people stand up and break the law … they almost always have very 
good reasons for doing so. And so the state should … look at its 
own processes to see what is causing this civil disobedience.57
Three Narratives about Law in Canadian Sanctuary 
Practices
Given the existence of these controversies over the legality 
of church sanctuary, it is not surprising that Randy Lippert, 
in his systemic study of Canadian sanctuary practices, 
concludes that law plays an important role for sanctuary 
providers.58 To assess how Canadian sanctuary providers 
understand the relation between sanctuary and law, Lippert 
draws on the work of critical legal scholars Patricia Ewick 
and Susan Silbey, who identify three distinct narratives 
about how individuals interact with the law.59 Lippert then 
examines how sanctuary providers draw on each of these 
narratives.60
In the first narrative, individuals are imagined to be “up 
against the law.” That is to say, they experience the law as an 
oppressive force in their lives, a force that must be resisted 
through avoidance strategies because it is too powerful to be 
confronted directly.61 According to Lippert, sanctuary pro-
viders frequently deploy this narrative. More precisely, they 
often present sanctuary as an extra-legal means through 
which marginalized migrants may avoid coercive deporta-
tion that flows from what they consider to be arbitrary and 
oppressive immigration laws. From this perspective, sanc-
tuary is a form of civil disobedience to purportedly unjust 
laws.62
In the second narrative, individuals are understood to 
be “before the ‘higher’ law.”63 Here, “law” is not limited to 
officially declared state legal norms. Instead, law is under-
stood to be a majestic and rational force that “stands outside 
and above social life.”64 According to Lippert, sanctuary 
providers resort to this narrative when they claim that the 
official refugee determination system produces results that 
not only are unjust, but also violate higher legal principles. 
Occasionally, the legal principles referred to are religious 
in nature—i .e . God’s law, religious natural law, etc More 
frequently, however, the claim is that deportation to face 
human rights violations is a breach of international law. As a 
result, where the official refugee determination system fails 
to protect individuals who will be subject to human rights 
violations on deportation, churches may legitimately take 
measures to prevent deportation. In these circumstances, it 
is the state authorities—not the churches—who are at risk of 
violating the law.65
The third narrative involves individuals “(playing) with 
the law.”66 In this narrative, the law is imagined as a set 
of complex processes, each of which is fraught with error 
and subject to significant delays. Individuals encounter 
these processes and attempt to navigate them strategically. 
In other words, law is experienced as a kind of high-stakes 
game. According to Lippert, sanctuary providers demon-
strate such an understanding of law when they assert that 
sanctuary aims not to undermine existing legal processes, 
but rather to delay deportation in order to provide migrants 
with extra time during which legal processes can run their 
course. The hope is that migrants will use this extra time to 
obtain more favourable outcomes.67
Sanctuary and Canadian State Law
While Lippert offers evidence to substantiate his claim that 
sanctuary providers deploy each of these three narratives,68 
his discussion of the role of law in sanctuary omits what 
one would think to be a critical consideration: he does not 
offer an extended analysis of the legality of sanctuary prac-
tices under state law. In fact, although he repeatedly asserts 
that sanctuary is illegal,69 on only one occasion—in an 
endnote—does he briefly articulate the basis of its illegality. 
Here is that explanation in full:
Sanctuary is illegal under Canada’s Immigration Act and Criminal 
Code because it involves aiding and abetting as well as conspiracy. 
Since at least 1976, the Immigration Act has prohibited aiding and 
abetting migrants subjected to deportation orders and has stipu-
lated fines of up to CDN$5,000 and two years imprisonment.70
Now, to be fair, journalists,71 public officials,72 and even 
sanctuary providers73 do frequently contend, often without 
elaboration, that sanctuary practices violate Canadian state 
law. Moreover, Lippert’s analysis of the role of law in sanctu-
ary incidents aims primarily at understanding how sanctu-
ary providers use and discuss law, rather than at inquiring 
into the validity—from the perspective of state law—of such 
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uses and discussions.74 As a result, his decision not to offer 
an in-depth analysis of state law may be understandable. For 
our purposes, however, closer attention to the relevant pro-
visions of state law that purport to render sanctuary illegal 
is warranted.
The Legality of Taking Sanctuary
There are two distinct questions to be asked regarding how 
state law may render sanctuary practices unlawful. The first 
relates to the lawfulness of taking sanctuary, and the second 
relates to the lawfulness of providing sanctuary.
With respect to the first question, whether it is lawful for 
migrants to take sanctuary, it must be recalled that migrants 
only enter sanctuary when they are vulnerable to removal 
from Canada.75 In principle, then, migrants in sanctu-
ary will usually be in violation of an enforceable removal 
order.76 Section 48(2) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act [IRPA] states that: “If a removal order is 
enforceable, the foreign national against whom it was made 
must leave Canada immediately.”77 Moreover, the IRPA’s 
general offences provisions (s.124), makes the violation of 
s.48(2) an offence: “Every person commits an offence who 
… contravenes a provision of this Act.”78 The penalties for 
this offence include a possible fine of $50,000 and a term of 
imprisonment of up to two years.79
Of course, in order to commit an offence by remaining 
in Canada in breach of a removal order, the removal order 
in question must be legally valid. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the validity of the removal order will frequently 
be contested in sanctuary incidents. As we have seen, most 
migrants in sanctuary are unsuccessful refugee claimants 
who contend that an error was made in their initial refugee 
determination. Indeed, the standard argument is not only 
that there was an error committed during the initial refu-
gee claim, but also that, due to systemic procedural flaws 
in the refugee determination system—most notably the 
lack of an appeal—the error cannot be corrected through 
official channels.80 In such circumstances a removal order 
might be invalid under state law for a variety of reasons, 
including breaches of international law81 that has become 
part of Canadian law,82 breaches of constitutional law,83 
or breaches of administrative law norms of procedural 
fairness.84
Lippert hints at such a possibility when he notes that 
sanctuary providers adopting the “before the (higher) law” 
narrative frequently make reference to international human 
rights law.85 It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
assertions about the invalidity of a removal order need not 
take the form of a “higher” law argument. That is to say, 
the contention is not necessarily that when a removal order 
complies with state-based immigration law but breaches 
international law, the latter (representing higher law) should 
trump the former. That would be a scenario of conflict of law 
between two distinct legal orders. Rather, the argument may 
simply be that the removal order is invalid under domestic 
law—possibly, but not necessarily, by virtue of the incor-
poration of international law into domestic law. This is not 
a conflict of law scenario, but rather a straightforward ques-
tion of legal validity from the perspective of a single (state-
based) legal order.
Of course, while migrants in sanctuary may contend 
that their removal orders are invalid due to breaches of 
Canadian state law, and thus that they themselves are not 
breaching Canadian state law by remaining in Canada, it is 
unlikely that such arguments would be persuasive in court. 
Indeed, those in sanctuary have usually already exhausted 
all avenues for judicially reviewing their negative refugee 
determinations as well as the subsequent immigration pro-
cedures culminating in their removal orders.86 Any avail-
able arguments regarding the legal invalidity of those pro-
cedures have, therefore, presumably already been rejected 
by courts by the time migrants enter sanctuary.87
To say that courts are unlikely to accept arguments 
regarding the invalidity of removal orders pertaining to 
migrants in sanctuary, however, does not mean that such 
arguments are unimportant to sanctuary practices. To the 
contrary, it is precisely in order to ensure that migrants can 
reasonably make such arguments that the church guide-
lines suggest that congregations provide sanctuary only 
to migrants who demonstrate that they qualify for refu-
gee protection under Canadian state law, notwithstand-
ing contrary findings in the official refugee determination 
system.88 In other words, one of the reasons congregations 
resort to sophisticated screening mechanisms is to ensure 
that sanctuary can be justified on the basis that the state has 
misapplied and misinterpreted state law in particular cases. 
Indeed, this helps to explain why sanctuary providers place 
so much focus on systemic procedural flaws in the refugee 
determination system, and, in particular, on the argument 
that misinterpretations and misapplications of state law 
in particular cases cannot currently be corrected because 
of the lack of an effective appeal mechanism.89 What this 
shows is that sanctuary is partly about individuals insisting 
that state institutions, including courts, do not have the final 
word on the interpretation of state law. Sanctuary practices 
are, to put this point in slightly different terms, premised on 
the notion that even the highest and most authoritative state 
institutions can—and sometimes do—get the law wrong.
In my view, then, in the event that migrants in sanctuary 
are charged with violating Canadian immigration law, and 
in particular with remaining in Canada in contravention of 
a removal order, courts are likely to dismiss arguments that 
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the underlying removal order is itself invalid under domes-
tic law. However, arguments regarding the legal invalidity 
of removal orders (as well as the legal invalidity of negative 
refugee determinations that lead to removal orders) under 
domestic state law remain central to Canadian sanctuary 
practices.
The Legality of Offering Sanctuary
With regard to the second question that must be posed when 
assessing the legality of sanctuary—whether those who pro-
vide sanctuary violate Canadian state law—the matter is 
even more complex.
There is one provision of Canadian immigration law90 
that is most frequently cited as purportedly rendering sanc-
tuary unlawful, s.131 of the IRPA . This section reads, in 
part:
Every person who knowingly … aid or abets … a person to contra-
vene section … 124, or who counsels a person to do so, commits an 
offence and is liable to the same penalty as that person.91
As we have seen, migrants in sanctuary arguably commit 
an offence under s.124 of the IRPA by remaining in Canada 
in violation of a removal order.92 Thus, to the extent that 
sanctuary providers (1) counsel, (2) aid, or (3) abet the com-
mission of that offence, the IRPA renders sanctuary provid-
ers liable to the same punishment as the migrants them-
selves: up to two years in jail and a $50,000 fine.93
Let us deal with counselling first. The Supreme Court 
has recently interpreted “counselling an offence” to mean 
“deliberate encouragement or active inducement of the 
commission of a[n] … offence.”94 The Court has also noted 
that the types of behaviour covered by counselling include: 
advising, recommending, procuring, bringing about, 
soliciting, asking repeatedly for, seeking, inviting, making 
a request, petitioning, urging, instigating, or persuading.95 
Now, it must be said that some sanctuary providers likely 
do counsel particular individuals to enter sanctuary and 
remain in Canada in violation of a removal order. Where 
they do so, they may be guilty of counselling the com-
mission of an offence. Where, however, migrants take the 
initiative and decide to remain in Canada (whether in sanc-
tuary or otherwise) in violation of a removal order without 
being deliberately encouraged or actively induced to do so, 
then sanctuary providers cannot be said to have counselled 
the commission of an offence. In other words, providing 
sanctuary does not necessarily entail counselling the com-
mission of an offence. Rather, whether sanctuary provid-
ers engage in counselling the commission of an offence is a 
contingent, factually dependent matter.
Next, let us consider the immigration law provisions 
on aiding and abetting. Based on documents provided in 
response to an Access to Information Request, these provi-
sions are at the heart of the legal theory according to which 
government officials apparently feel that sanctuary violates 
Canadian law. According to a document entitled “Avoiding 
Deportation by Claiming Sanctuary,” prepared by the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC):
It is an offence pursuant to IRPA to aid and abet a person to con-
travene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In practice 
prosecution is discretionary and therefore churches which act-
ively assist persons in evading removal have, to date not faced 
charges.96
Similarly, a second document entitled “Sanctuary in 
Churches,” also prepared by CIC, states: “Its [sic] is an 
offence pursuant to IRPA … to aid and abet a person to con-
travene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.”97
In what sense, then, might providing sanctuary consti-
tute aiding and abetting the offence of remaining in Canada 
in violation of a removal order? Because no sanctuary pro-
viders in Canada have ever been charged under these pro-
visions, there is no case law to assist us in interpreting the 
provisions in this specific context. However, even setting 
aside the arguments regarding the validity of the under-
lying removal orders in sanctuary cases, it is not obvious 
that Canadian sanctuary providers in fact aid and abet the 
commission of an offence.
In examining whether sanctuary providers engage in 
aiding and abetting, the first step is to notice that while the 
terms are often used in tandem, they do, in fact, represent 
distinct offences. As Justice Cory put it in R . v . Greyeyes:
The terms “aiding” and “abetting” are often used together in the 
context of determining whether persons are parties to an offence. 
Although the meanings of these terms are similar, they are separ-
ate concepts … To aid … means to assist or help the actor … To 
abet … includes encouraging, instigating, promoting or procur-
ing the crime to be committed.98
Let us, therefore, consider “aiding” and “abetting” in turn.
With respect to “aiding,” it is important to recall the dis-
tinction between “concealment” and “exposure” strategies 
in sanctuary practices.99 Where a church conceals a person 
who is subject to a valid removal order so as to avoid detec-
tion by authorities, it seems clear that they are engaged in 
the offence of “aiding.” However, where churches publicly 
declare that they have provided sanctuary to a particular 
migrant, adding that they will not take any steps to resist 
official enforcement activities, then it is not clear how they 
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are “aiding” the migrant to commit the offence of remaining 
in Canada in violation of a removal order. This is significant 
because many churches take active steps not only to inform 
state officials about their decision to accord sanctuary, but 
also to indicate that they have no intention of interfering 
with enforcement measures. The following comments by a 
sanctuary provider are typical in this regard:
The decision was made right from the outset that this church 
would never be locked so that the authorities could never say that 
they were stopped from coming into the church. And we went on 
public record … that the church was always open and we were not 
going to stand in the way of the law.100
Other sanctuary providers echoed such an approach:
We called the immigration people and said, “If you want to come in 
at any time, we will show you around …” If Immigration decided 
that they wanted to come pick [the person in sanctuary] up, they 
[can] just tell us. We’ll hold the door [open] … We aren’t going to 
stand in the way of an actual apprehension, but we are also going 
to grant her sanctuary.”101
It is, moreover, important to note that, by virtue of 
legislation repealing all recognition of sanctuary as a mat-
ter of state law in the seventeenth century,102 the fact that 
migrants may be located inside churches in no way dimin-
ishes the legal authority of Canadian police or immigration 
officials to enforce removal orders against them. If author-
ities choose not to enforce removal orders against migrants 
they know to be taking sanctuary inside churches, that deci-
sion is purely political (i .e . the government wishes to avoid 
the negative political reaction that media accounts of the use 
of police force inside a church inevitably engenders). Merely 
increasing the political cost of enforcing state law should not 
be interpreted to constitute “aiding”; otherwise anyone who 
seeks to bring public attention to unpopular enforcement 
measures would be guilty of “aiding” the commission of an 
offence.
It is worth noting one other sense in which sanctuary 
providers might be said to commit the offence of “aiding,” 
namely by sheltering, feeding, and providing other servi-
ces to individuals in sanctuary. This reasoning would run 
as follows: when people knowingly assist migrants subject 
to removal orders by providing them with food, shelter, or 
other services, they facilitate those migrants’ ongoing viola-
tions of the removal orders.
There are, however, two problems with such reasoning. 
The first is that Canadian legislation does not explicitly pro-
hibit “harbouring” individuals who are unlawfully present 
in Canada.103 The equivalent US legislation, in contrast, 
prohibits not only “aiding”104 but also “harboring”105 aliens 
not lawfully entitled to enter or remain in the country. 
Indeed, in the 1980s several sanctuary providers were con-
victed of harbouring aliens unlawfully present in the US.106 
Moreover, as in the US, harbouring is recognized as distinct 
from “aiding” in Canadian law. For example, although the 
Canadian Criminal Code contains general provisions on 
“aiding,”107 it also explicitly criminalizes “harbouring” 
those who commit specific crimes.108
There is, therefore, a distinction between “aiding” and 
“harbouring” under Canadian law. Because Canadian law 
does not explicitly prohibit harbouring migrants who are 
unlawfully present in the country, in my view, merely pro-
viding shelter, food, and other services to such migrants 
should not be considered “aiding” the commission of an 
offence.
The second reason why “aiding” should not be inter-
preted to cover providing food, shelter, and other servi-
ces to migrants subject to a removal order is that such an 
interpretation would cast the net far too widely. Indeed, 
this interpretation would criminalize the work of organiza-
tions that run shelters for women without legal immigration 
status who are victims of domestic violence, legal clinics 
that offer services to undocumented migrants, schools that 
educate children who are not lawfully in the country, hos-
pitals that provide emergency medical treatment to individ-
uals without status, and even police services with “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” policies regarding immigration status. By pro-
viding services to migrants unlawfully present in Canada, 
such organizations arguably “aid” migrants to remain in 
Canada unlawfully, and thus could, in principle, be covered 
by the broadest possible reading of the “aiding” provisions. 
However, if Parliament intended to criminalize all humani-
tarian assistance provided to migrants who are in the coun-
try unlawfully, surely they would have done so explicitly.109
Rather than adopting an overly broad understanding of 
“aiding,” a more reasonable approach would be to restrict 
“aiding” in this context to scenarios where the accused 
materially assists migrants to avoid detection or otherwise 
evade the enforcement of a valid removal order. In apply-
ing this restricted understanding of “aiding,” it is import-
ant to recall that when churches offering sanctuary engage 
solely in exposure strategies, they, by definition, do not 
assist migrants avoid detection. Moreover, while they may 
increase the political cost of enforcing removal orders, they 
often nonetheless assert in advance that they will not phys-
ically interfere with the enforcement of removal orders. In 
my view, then, to the extent that sanctuary providers engage 
solely in exposure strategies,110 they should not be under-
stood to be “aiding” the commission of the offence com-
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mitted by migrants who remain in Canada in violation of a 
valid removal order.
So much for “aiding,” but what about the third possible 
grounds for the purported illegality of providing sanctu-
ary, namely the immigration law provisions on “abetting”? 
Abetting in Canadian law is similar to the criminal law pro-
visions on counselling an offence, in that abetting involves 
encouraging someone to commit an offence. As Justice Cory 
noted in R . v . Greyeyes, the Criminal Code provides that
any person who abets any person in committing an offence is a 
party to that offence. In order to secure a conviction, the Crown 
must prove not only that the accused encouraged the principal 
with his or her words or acts, but also that the accused intended 
to do so.111
Similarly, in a frequently cited passage, the Alberta Supreme 
Court explains that, to secure a conviction on the charge of 
abetting, the accused
must intend that the words or acts will encourage the principal. 
The criminal law is concerned with acts or words that are done or 
uttered with the intent or for the purpose of counselling, encour-
aging, instigating or promoting the commission of the acts by the 
principal actor . Accordingly before an accused person can be con-
victed the Crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, both the 
words of encouragement and the intention of the appellant to so 
encourage.112
In other words, whether sanctuary providers engage in abet-
ting rests on whether they encourage or instigate the com-
mission of the principal offence (i .e . the migrant remaining 
in Canada in violation of a valid removal order).
As with my discussion of the offence of counselling 
above, whether sanctuary providers engage in abetting is 
a factually contingent matter. Some sanctuary providers 
likely do encourage migrants to remain in Canada in vio-
lation of a valid removal order. In other cases, however, 
migrants requesting sanctuary fully intend to remain in 
the country regardless of whether they succeed in obtaining 
sanctuary. If they are unable to obtain sanctuary, they will 
remain underground and try to avoid detection by immi-
gration authorities. If, on the other hand, they succeed in 
obtaining sanctuary they will publicly move into the church 
and hope that the state chooses not to enforce the removal 
order against them. In such circumstances, it is unclear in 
what sense church communities that accede to requests for 
sanctuary can be said to “encourage” the commission of the 
principal offence of remaining in Canada in violation of a 
removal order.
Moreover, as with a broad interpretation of “aiding,” 
there is a serious danger in adopting an expansive reading 
of “abetting” that would cover the kind of moral and pol-
itical support that church communities offer migrants in 
sanctuary. Merely offering moral and political support to 
people who violate a valid law—rather than encouraging 
them to break the law—should not constitute “abetting” 
lest the net be too widely cast. In fact, an expansive inter-
pretation of “abetting” would catch a significant number 
of influential public officials and community leaders, who 
regularly provide political assistance to migrants who are in 
Canada in violation of removal orders. Indeed, several sit-
ting members of Parliament have offered political support 
to migrants in sanctuary, and would thus be vulnerable to 
prosecution under an excessively expansive understanding 
of “abetting.”113
In my view, the best interpretation of “abetting” in the 
context of church sanctuary incidents is a restricted read-
ing that would cover only circumstances where sanctuary 
providers actively encourage migrants to remain in Canada 
in violation of a valid removal order. Whether particular 
sanctuary providers in fact do so is a factually contingent 
matter; the mere accession to a request for sanctuary by a 
migrant should not, on its own, be understood to constitute 
“abetting.”
The Final Word on Legality and Canadian Sanctuary 
Practices
All of this is to say, then, that those asserting that Canadian 
sanctuary practices are clearly illegal have not accorded 
sufficient attention to the relevant provisions of state law. 
A close assessment reveals that individuals taking sanctu-
ary may appear to be in violation of a removal order, but 
churches providing sanctuary take measures to ensure that 
they can at least plausibly argue that these removal orders 
are legally invalid under state law—even if the state refuses 
to recognize this legal invalidity. Moreover, even if the 
removal orders in question are legally valid, and it is thus 
unlawful for individual migrants to remain in the country 
by taking sanctuary, it is still not at all obvious that faith-
based communities publicly providing sanctuary necessarily 
violate state law.
In the end, while there is admittedly room for disagree-
ment regarding the legality of Canadian sanctuary practices 
under state law, what is certain is that such practices involve 
a fascinating set of legal claims. In particular, sanctuary 
practices raise competing jurisdictional claims between 
multiple, partly overlapping, legal systems (i .e . domestic law, 
international law, ecclesiastic law). They also involve differ-
ing interpretations about how those multiple legal systems 
intersect, and what to do in the event of conflict—although 
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I hasten to add that one should not be too quick to presume 
that there are necessarily conflicts. Sanctuary practices also 
raise questions about who has the final word on interpreting 
norms within state-based legal systems, whether state insti-
tutions or those who are subject to them.
What I want to emphasize in all of this is that assess-
ing the claims and questions raised by sanctuary practices 
requires close attention not just to broad political argu-
ments, not just, that is to say, to how sanctuary is discussed 
and debated. Rather, close attention must also be paid to 
the precise legal norms that inhere in the legal systems at 
play in sanctuary incidents. Such close attention offers an 
intriguing picture of legal systems not only conflicting, but 
also interacting, and, at times, even mimicking one another 
in order to publicly highlight the internal inconsistencies in 
the opposing legal decision-making process.
Conclusion
Despite its formal abolishment as a matter of state law in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, church sanctuary 
continues to be practiced in Canada to this day. These prac-
tices have been surprisingly effective, not just in terms of 
preventing the de facto deportation of individual migrants 
who allege a fear of persecution (and in securing legal immi-
gration status for such individuals), but also in terms of pla-
cing significant pressure on government actors to introduce 
policy changes that would bring the official refugee deter-
mination system into compliance with both domestic and 
international law.
Law plays a complex and controversial role in contem-
porary Canadian sanctuary practices. While public debates 
about the legitimacy of church sanctuary frequently turn on 
the issue of whether sanctuary is a justifiable form of civil 
disobedience to purportedly unjust laws, framing sanctuary 
in such terms is problematic on several levels. In particu-
lar, many of those involved in church sanctuary practices 
do not accept that these practices in fact violate state law, 
and thus that they can accurately be characterized as civil 
disobedience.
There are two distinct senses in which we can understand 
these arguments. The first, which relates to whether the state 
is acting lawfully in seeking to deport particular migrants, 
is especially relevant when those seeking sanctuary claim 
they face a risk of persecution abroad, notwithstanding 
a contrary finding in the official refugee determination 
system. Advocates of church sanctuary in such circum-
stances frequently suggest that deporting these individuals 
is unlawful, and that when faith-based communities take 
measures to prevent such unlawful deportations they are 
actually enhancing respect for the rule of law. Interestingly, 
these arguments usually involve procedural rather than 
substantive complaints about the refugee determination 
system. That is to say, sanctuary advocates suggest that, due 
to systemic procedural flaws in the Canadian refugee deter-
mination system, including the lack of an effective appeal 
mechanism to correct false negative determinations, some 
who do in fact qualify for refugee protection under state 
law are not recognized as such. Churches then suggest that 
it is only because of these procedural flaws that they must 
step in to prevent the unlawful deportation of such “genu-
ine” refugees. In order to be in a position to plausibly make 
such assertions, churches are placed in the curious position 
of mimicking the decision-making processes mandated by 
state law in order to determine whether those seeking sanc-
tuary do, in principle, qualify for refugee protection.
The second sense in which sanctuary providers may claim 
that they do not breach state law concedes that migrants in 
sanctuary themselves violate immigration law. They may go 
on to argue, however, that publicly providing sanctuary to 
such individuals is not unlawful because, so long as sanc-
tuary providers do not conceal migrants from authorities 
and do not resist enforcement activities, they do not legally 
interfere with the enforcement of state immigration law. 
On this view, although the state may choose not to under-
take deportation measures against individuals known to be 
inside churches because it wishes to avoid the political con-
sequences that such measures would bring, churches offer-
ing sanctuary do not impede these deportation measures in 
a manner cognizable by state law. Of course, where sanctu-
ary practices involve concealing migrants from detection by 
immigration officials, such reasoning would not apply.
Taken together, the argument that Canadian govern-
ment officials offered in response to the incident involving 
Mohamed Cherfi (i .e . that churches should cease provid-
ing sanctuary because “no one is above the law”) is based 
on an excessively narrow view of the legal claims involved. 
To be sure, there are rule-of-law arguments in favour of the 
notion that churches should not be allowed to exempt them-
selves from the application of Canadian immigration law. 
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that some Canadian 
sanctuary providers insist that sanctuary practices are 
effective precisely because they involve a deliberate and 
politically charged breach of purportedly unjust Canadian 
laws (i .e . civil disobedience). However, there are also plaus-
ible rule-of-law arguments in favour of sanctuary practices. 
Firstly, it is not clear that faith-based communities actually 
breach state law when they provide sanctuary to those who 
request it. Secondly, and in my view more importantly, sanc-
tuary practices may actually uphold both Canadian and 
international law by establishing a de facto appeal mechan-
ism to catch errors in the procedurally flawed official refu-
gee determination system, thereby preventing Canada from 
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unlawfully deporting refugees to countries where they face 
persecution.
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